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THE SUPREME COURT ON
ABORTION-A
DISSENTING OPINION
By PATRICK T. CONLEY AND ROBERT J. MCKENNA*
In the decade of the 1850's one of the most vexing constitutional ques-
tions concerned the status of slavery in the federal territories. For reasons
which historians have not yet fully fathomed, this issue became a vent for
the economic, emotional, psychological, and moral disputes generated by
the institution of slavery itself. During this acrimonious debate three basic
positions emerged: (1) the pro-slave argument which held that Congress
had a positive duty to protect a slaveowner's property rights in the federal
territories; (2) a diametrically opposed view, advanced by anti-slavery
Northerners, stating that Congress must ban slavery from the territories;
and (3) the middle ground of "popular sovereignty" which left the decision
on slavery to the residents of the areas in question. Then, in 1857, a
Southern-dominated Supreme Court attempted to resolve this morally-
charged dispute in what it considered to be a rational and impartial man-
ner. The result was the Dred Scott decision in which the Court novelly
employed the procedural Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment to
vindicate the pro-slave position. But it did so in disregard of historical
precedents which made that view untenable. To compound its error, the
Court contended that Negroes could not attain citizenship because such
status contravened the intent of the Founding Fathers.'
The Dred Scott decision did not resolve the great moral dispute over
slavery and the status of the Negro in American society. It was so patently
unsound that it was overridden-both by subsequent events and by the
less violent process of constitutional amendment.
On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court, in magisterial
fashion, undertook to resolve another moral controversy in the case of Roe
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History. He holds an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame and will receive a
J.D. from Suffolk University Law School in June. Professor McKenna is an Associate Profes-
sor of Politics at Salve Regina. He holds an M.A. from Brown University and is a Ph.D.
candidate at Catholic University of America. Professor McKenna, who is also a State Senator
from Newport, is a specialist in Church-State relations.
I The best analysis of this controversial decision is VINCENT C. HOPKINS, DRED ScoTr's CASE
(1951).
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v. Wade,' and a companion case, Doe v. Bolton.3 These decisions concerned
abortion, and here a right more fundamental than citizenship was at
stake-at issue was the right to life. The Dred Scott analogy to Roe v.
Wade is not an exercise in hyperbole; not only was a more basic right
involved, but a much larger class was affected. In 1857, approximately
4,200,000 blacks and their descendants were judicially attainted, while in
the year 1973 alone about 5 million living human fetuses will be shorn of
their natural right to life for at least the first six months of their existence.4
Unlike the Biblical decree of Herod, however, Roe v. Wade does not
mandate a slaughter of the innocents. The Court, in fact, explicitly denied
the contention of appellant Jane Roe (a fictional name), that a woman's
right to an abortion is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her
pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she
alone chooses. "With this we do not agree," said Justice Blackmun for the
majority. His statement was echoed by the Chief Justice: "Plainly, the
Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion on
demand," affirmed Mr. Burger. 5 Even the libertarian Justice Douglas
admitted that "voluntary abortion at any time and place regardless of
medical standards would impinge on a rightful concern of society. The
woman's health is part of that concern; as is the life of the fetus after
quickening." "
But, although the decision was not a total victory for the abortion
advocates, it was a substantial victory nonetheless. In essence, the Court
concluded that a state criminal abortion statute like that of Texas, which
"excepts from criminality only a life saving procedure on behalf of the
mother, without regard to a pregnancy stage and without recognition of the
other interest involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 7
The so-called right which the Texas abortion statute allegedly in-
fringed upon was the expectant mother's right of privacy. In deference
to maternal privacy the Court then proceeded to formulate the following
abortion schedule: "(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the
first trimester [the first three months], the abortion decision and its effec-
tuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician; (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the
2 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
3 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
1 These figures are approximations based upon data in THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT, Series A 59-70, at 9 (1965); and, THE
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1972, Table No. 62 (live births), and Table No.
78 (fetal deaths), at 50, 57 (1972).
Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
93 S. Ct. at 759 (Douglas, J., concurring).
93 S. Ct. at 732.
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end of the first trimester [the second three months], the State, in promot-
ing its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health; (c) For the stage subsequent to viability [the final three months],
the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may,
if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life
or health of the mother."8
Such was the fiat of the Court-a formidable pronouncement indeed.
Justice Blackmun's rationale and argumentation, however, were not suffi-
cient to support the Court's foray into the legislative domain because the
decision contained several dubious moral, logical, biomedical, and legal
contentions.
First, the Court explicitly admitted that it "need not resolve the diffi-
cult question of when life begins . . . .the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer." Later it took notice of the fact that the Catholic Church, "many
non-Catholics", and "many physicians" believe that life begins at concep-
tion.' In view of these considerations and the Court's candid admission of
its own ignorance, it seems incredible that the Court could proceed with
confidence to schematize abortion according to the trimester system. It
chided Texas for arbitrarily selecting conception as a basis for that state's
abortion law, and then, in an equally arbitrary manner, chose viability as
the basis of its own formula. In effect, the Court said: "We do not know if
human life exists prior to viability, but even if it does we choose not to
protect it, and we bar the states from protecting it also."
It had often been the practice of the Court when it could not resolve
or define a key issue before it (like the nature of a "republican form of
government") to declare the matter a political question and therefore non-
justiciable. If ever the doctrine of political question should have been in-
voked, it was when the Court asserted that the question of life's commence-
ment was beyond its ability to resolve. To proceed in the face of that
admission was reckless folly. It was, as stated by Justice White in his
dissent, "an exercise in raw judicial power;" an "improvident and extrava-
gant exercise of the power of judicial review." White could find "no consti-
tutional warrant" for the Court's action, nor could he accept "the Court's
exercise of its clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier
to state efforts to protect human life and by investing mothers and doctors
with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it."'' The Court
Id.
Id. at 730.
93 S. Ct. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
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did rush in, however, armed with its nescience regarding the origins of
human life, and the results were disastrous.
Having thus disposed of the question of life, the justices examined four
main theories regarding the point in time when the rights of a person at-
tach to a human fetus, namely (1) conception, (2) quickening or first
movement, (3) viability, or (4) birth. Justice Blackmun concluded that
"the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not in-
clude the unborn." Here the Court buttressed its contention with formida-
ble but not insurmountable evidence." With equal effort it could have
reached the opposite conclusion, especially in view of the fact that no
evidence was adduced to show that the drafters intended to exclude the
unborn when they utilized the word "person" in the various sections of the
Constitution where it appears. In the absence of a clear constitutional
intent, arising no doubt from the fact that the particular problem raised
in Roe v. Wade never occurred to previous constitutional draftsmen, the
Court should have exercised restraint.
The Court has applied the "compelling state interest" standard to
those legislatures which have set up classifications or categories, the mem-
bers of which have been deprived of equal protection of the law. In several
recent opinions a majority of the Court asserted that the strictness of the
standard for decision in cases involving classifications made by legislative
bodies varies according to the nature of the right placed in jeopardy; the
more fundamental the right involved, the greater was the judicial require-
ment to "carefully and meticulously scrutinize" the classification in the
light of the following principles:"2
(a) As the right in jeopardy becomes more fundamental, the more perfect
must be the relationship between the classification excluding a human group
from the enjoyment of the right and the purpose for which the classification
is made.
(b) As the right involved becomes more fundamental, the more "compel-
ling" the state or governmental interest must be in making a classification
excluding certain human groups from the enjoyment of the right.
In Roe v. Wade the Court has not practiced what it preached. In effect,
it has established a judicial classification consisting of those unborn hu-
mans who have not reached the stage of viability and has deprived these
individuals of their right to life by making them fair game for the abortion-
ist. Several learned anti-abortionists who presented an amicus curiae brief
to the Court for its consideration make this valid observation. They argued
that "because of the fundamental nature of life, the most compelling of all
1 93 S. Ct. at 728-31.
12 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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interests would have to be shown on the part of the Court in order to carve
out such a classification, which would exclude the lives of unborn humans
from the protection of the law."' 3
The Court did, indeed, advance a rationale to justify its conclusions
by claiming that "the right of personal privacy" is "broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,"
though admitting that the right was "not unqualified and must be consid-
ered against important state interests in regulation."' 4 When the Court
tried to explain why this alleged right of privacy was fundamental enough
to override a state's interest in the protection of fetal life, the shallowness
of its value system was glaringly revealed.
Justice Blackmun justified abortion on the grounds of privacy because
"maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distress-
ful life and future," cause psychological harm, bring "distress for all con-
cerned," or place a social "stigma" on the unwed mother. These were the
"weighty reasons" for excluding the unborn from the enjoyment of the
right to life. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion arising out of Roe v.
Wade and its companion case involving a Georgia abortion law (Doe v.
Bolton), went to more ridiculous extremes. Childbirth, said Douglas, "may
deprive a woman of her preferred life style and force upon her a radically
different and undesired future." She would be required "to endure the
discomforts of pregnancy; to incur the pain, higher mortality rate, and
aftereffects of childbirth; to abandon educational plans; to sustain loss of
income; to forgo the satisfactions of careers; to tax further mental and
physical health . . .and, in some cases to bear the lifelong stigma of
unwed motherhood."' 5 One could scarcely imagine a more amoral and
hedonistic rationale. For the highest court in a land which professes spirit-
ual values and claims foundation "under God" to use such criteria to
justify the extermination of human life is a tragic occurrence in every sense
of the word. Here is humanism incarnate-man has become God.
The justifications for abortion expressed by Justices Blackmun and
Douglas are the epitome of human selfishness and self-love. The counter-
vailing evils of easy abortion were thrust aside by the Court. Among these
baneful effects, according to Dr. Paul Marx, are "the denigration of the
traditional sexual morality distilled from centuries of wisdom, the aban-
donment of self-control as an indispensable human virtue, the substitution
of subjective whim for the priceless heritage of human knowledge, the
enthronement of utilitarianism over principled morality, the devaluation
" Brief of Certain Physicians, Professors, and Fellows of the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae at 59-61, Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), Doe
v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
93 S. Ct. at 727.
93 S. Ct. at 759 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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of life itself, the ruination of the moral basis of natural human rights, and
the obvious opening to enthanasia."l A society that countenances the
brutality of abortion is one in which psychological ills, irreverence for life,
and sexual promiscuity are likely to proliferate. In sum, therefore, we have
paid an exorbitant price to sustain a woman's right to personal privacy.
That alleged right, however, is more a judicial fiction than a verifiable
fact. Even Justice Douglas frankly confesses that "there is no mention of
privacy in our Bill of Rights," nor is the type of privacy claimed in Roe v.
Wade specifically mentioned in any other section of the federal Constitu-
tion." The Court invented this right in Griswold v. Connecticut" when it
held that a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives was unconstitu-
tional in as far as the law applied to married persons. The Court advanced
the so-called "penumbra" doctrine which held that various guarantees in
the Bill of Rights impliedly create zones of privacy.' 9 In Roe v. Wade a
woman's personal decision to abort her child was placed inside that judi-
cially protected private zone.
In their attempt to vindicate this alleged right the appellant used a
scattergun approach by claiming that the Texas statute abridged rights of
personal privacy protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Four-
teenth Amendments. One of these random shots found its mark, when the
high court held that the right claimed by the appellant was "founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty. 2 0
In recent years the Court has developed a complex formula to protect
from invasion by the states those rights which it uncovers in the mysterious
recesses of the Constitution. The test traditionally applied to state social
and economic legislation is whether or not the law (for example, the Texas
abortion statute) has "a rational relation to a valid state objective." Had
this test been employed in Roe v. Wade the state statute may have been
upheld. However, the Court devised a more stringent standard in Shapiro
v. Thompson 2 which held that as the right involved becomes more funda-
mental, the more "compelling" the state interest must be in passing a law
which abridges that right.2 2 In Shapiro and subsequent rulings the "com-
pelling state interest" standard was used only in situations involving the
equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan
attacked this new criteria when he asserted in a Shapiro dissent that
"when a statute affects only matters not mentioned in the Federal Consti-
tution and is not arbitrary or irrational" the Court is not entitled "to pick
" P. MARx, THE DEATH PEDDLERS: WAR ON THE UNBORN 182 (1971).
93 S. Ct. at 756 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring).
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" Id. at 484.
'0 93 S. Ct. at 727.
21 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
22 Id. at 634.
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out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and
give them added protection under an unusually stringent equal protection
test." Such action, concluded Harlan, "would go far toward making this
Court a 'super-legislature.' "23 Yet the Court went even beyond this in Roe
v. Wade-it not only held a woman's private right to abort her unborn
child to be "fundamental;" it also expanded the stringent "compelling
state interest" test in a novel way to embrace the Due Process Clause
(shades of Dred Scott!)."
The majority's decision regarding the fundamental nature of the par-
ticular right of privacy asserted in this case was vigorously and persu-
asively attacked by Justice Rehnquist in a dissenting opinion: "The fact
that a majority of the States, reflecting . . .the majority sentiment in
those states, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century seems
. . .as strong an indication as there is that the asserted right to an abor-
tion is not. . . fundamental. Even today, when society's views on abortion
are changing, the very existence of the debate is evidence that the 'right'
to an abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellants would have
us believe," concluded Rehnquist. 5 In support of this latter statement he
could have cited with telling effect the results of the 1972 abortion refer-
enda in Michigan and North Dakota. In the former state the pro-life advo-
cates polled 61% of the vote, while in North Dakota their total was an
overwhelming 79%.5
The right of privacy asserted by the Court is not only absent from the
express provisions of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and later
Amendments, it is not generally recognized by law, by custom, or by ma-
jority opinion. How could such an alleged right, therefore, be "so rooted
in the traditional conscience of our people to be ranked as fundamental."
The Court does not satisfactorily explain its startling judgment. It "simply
fashions," says dissenting Justice White, "a new constitutional right for
pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action,
invests that right with sufficient substance to override most state abor-
tion statutes.'"'
The Court with equal effort could have "discovered" the unborn's
right to life, invested it with "fundamental" status, and clothed it with
judicial protection. This right is not explicit in any part of the Constitu-
tion, but, unlike the right to abort, it is recognized by law, by custom, and
by majority opinion. It can also be inferred from the phraseology of no less
a document than our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths
23 Id. at 662 (Harlan J., dissenting).
21 93 S. Ct. at 727-28.
Id. at 737 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28 National Catholic Reporter, Nov. 24, 1972 at 6 gives an in-depth analysis of these referenda.
27 93 S. Ct. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
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to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." Traditionally the term "crea-
tion" is applied to conception rather than to the other definable stages of
fetal life.
This line of argumentation is at least as formidable as the privacy
doctrine which the Court concocted, but, unfortunately, the Court used its
legal legerdemain to uphold the right of privacy at the expense of the
unborn's right to life-a strange choice indeed, especially in view of the
solicitude shown by the Court for criminals under a death sentence in
Furman v. Georgia.28
Such was the decision of the Court in Roe v. Wade and its companion
Doe v. Bolton. Almost as an afterthought, however, the justices alluded to
a serious flaw in the arguments of those who sought to uphold state abor-
tion restrictions. The state appellees in Wade and Bolton asserted that the
unborn's right to life was constitutionally protected by the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet the state statutes
which they defended, especially Georgia's more "modern" law, allowed
abortion in special circumstances: (1) if the life or health of the mother
were endangered (this was the extent of the Texas statute); (2) if the fetus
would very likely be born with a grave, permanent, and irremedial mental
or physical defect; or (3) if the pregnancy resulted from forcible or statu-
tory rape. As Justice Douglas was quick to observe, the Georgia statute
permits fetal destruction in several instances without regard for due pro-
cess or the developmental stage of the fetus. 9
Justice Blackmun, in a footnote in Roe v. Wade, also spotted the
dilemma. Despite a broad proscription on abortion, an exception exists in
every state, at least to save the life of the mother. "But if the fetus is a
person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of law, and if
the mother's condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas excep-
tion appear to be out of line with the Amendment's command," queried
Blackmun, "and why is the woman not a principal or an accomplice" to
the killing? This inconsistency can only be effectively resolved by recourse
to the position that any direct taking of the life of the fetus is a moral and
legal crime for all involved.3 0 Whether such an absolute and rigid moral
standard should be legally imposed, however, is a question of great diffi-
culty for which we have no solution.
Our dissenting opinion to the Court's abortion ruling would be merely
an intellectual catharsis and an exercise in frustration, if the Court's action
could not be overridden. Our purpose thus far has been to show that the
- 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
93 S. Ct. at 761 (Douglas, J., concurring).
3' 93 S. Ct. at 729 n.54.
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decision was patently unsound from either a logical, biomedical, moral, or
legal perspective. Hopefully this knowledge of the decision's infirmity will
provide an incentive to secure its reversal. Thus, in conclusion we offer
guidelines for those who wish to challenge the ruling and vindicate the
rights of the unborn child.
At the state level the Legislature has several plausible options. First,
it can take advantage of the Court's failure to resolve "the difficult ques-
tion of when life begins." It can declare as a conclusive presumption "that
life commences at the instant of conception."'" This legislative finding of
fact will reestablish protection for the unborn child, at least until the issue
is settled as to whether or not the Court will accept a legislative determina-
tion in this area.3" Such a course of action, however, is at best a stopgap
measure. Second, the Legislature can memorialize Congress to adopt a
constitutional amendment to protect the unborn child. Third, the Legisla-
ture can petition Congress to call a constitutional convention to act on this
issue. Fourth, it can require that the father's rights be protected in those
cases where he does not agree to have his child killed.3 Fifth, it can and
1' On March 13, 1973 the Rhode Island General Assembly passed Senate Bill 73-S287 Substi-
tute "A", "An Act Relating to Abortion." This Act was principally sponsored by Senators
Taylor, Chaves, and McKenna. Governor Philip W. Noel signed the bill into law the same
day the Senate voted final passage.
This Act speaks, directly to the Court's acknowledgement of "the difficult question of
when life begins ... the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is
not in a position to speculate as to the answer." The measure states that "It shall be conclu-
sively presumed in any action . . .that human life commences at the instant of conception
and that said human life at said instant of conception is a person within the language and
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."
This act is presently being challenged before the U.S. District Court for the District of
Rhode Island. The issue is quite clearly joined: When is human life present, and is it a
legislative prerogative or a judicial prerogative to determine this question of fact?
32 In a Connecticut case, Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), in which this
issue was raised, a request for rehearing was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. 41 U.S.L.W.
3554 (U.S. April 16, 1973).
1 North Carolina has enacted a law which requires written permission for the abortion from
the husband when the woman is a minor (under 18); if the woman is an unmarried minor,
written permission from her parents is required. 1B N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971). A
bill is pending in the Rhode Island General Assembly at this writing. This bill, 73-S618 "An
Act Requiring Family Court Permission Prior to an Abortion," provides that any "person
desiring an abortion . ..shall . ..request permission for said abortion .. .[of] the chief
judge of the Family Court. . . .The chief judge shall appoint an attorney to represent the
unborn child." It further requires that "The court shall grant the petition if it finds that...
the abortion . ..will not destroy human life, except where necessary in order to save the
life of the person who desires the abortion, and that the father of the unborn child consents
to an abortion freely and without duress or compulsion of any kind, and, the court shall
further fully consider the rights of the unborn child." This bill will join the question raised
but not resolved by the Court in Roe v. Wade, "Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton,
post. do we discuss the father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the
abortion decision."
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should provide that no person or institution shall be required to assist in
any way with an abortion if such an act violates the values of that person
or institution.
Despite these state remedies, however, the most effective countermea-
sures can be wielded by Congress. For example, the Congress can adopt
and propose to the states a constitutional right-to-life amendment. While
this is a time-consuming remedy it is also one that would be decisive and
relatively enduring. It is the best course of action to pursue. The Constitu-
tion is not an instrument to tinker with or to alter capriciously, but cer-
tainly the right to life is an issue comparable in magnitude to such ques-
tions as the right to vote, the prohibition of intoxicating drink, the compo-
sition of the electoral college, or the jurisdiction of the federal
courts-issues which have been the subject of constitutional amendment.
Second, Congress can pass an act to establish the start of life at the instant
of conception and thus answer the key question sidestepped by the Court.
Third, the Congress can also remove the power of the Supreme Court to
hear appeals in this area by altering the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
There is precedent for such a move in the case of Ex parte McCardlel4 and
in the OPA cases of the World War I era. 5 Such a course of action may
seem drastic, but the Court's abortion ruling demands a vigorous and
effective response.
The Dred Scott decision's denial of the Negro's right to citizenship was
only overcome by the concerted and forceful effort of those who thought
the Court's opinion morally, historically, and legally unsound; can we do
less for those living yet unborn than to vindicate their right to life itself?
34 74 U.S. 506 (1869).
Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1944). The Senate Judiciary Committee's version of the Crime
Control Act of 1968 attempted to thwart the Miranda decision by denying to any article Il
court, jurisdiction to review or reverse a ruling of a state trial court in a criminal proceeding
which admitted in evidence as voluntarily made an admission or confession of any accused
person. This provision was deleted from the final act, but the report associated with this
provision contains a forceful and persuasive defense of congressional power over jurisdiction.
See Title H of the amended S. 917, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., in S. Rep. No. 1097.
